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IS THERE A DOCTRINAL ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF
GENERIC LIABILITY?
WILLIAM POWERS, JR.*

PROLOGUE

Sometimes trying to solve a problem tells us more about how we
solve problems than about the problem itself. So it is with the problem of generic liability.' We can ask a variety of interesting questions
* Hines H. Baker & Thelma Kelley Baker Chair in Law, The University of Texas School
of Law.
1. The term "generic liability" refers to products liability based on a claim that an overall
product, not just a particular design feature, is unreasonably dangerous. Under a claim of generic liability a plaintiff need not claim that the manufacturer should have used an alternative
design. It is enough for the plaintiff to claim that merely putting the product on the market was
unreasonably dangerous. Thus, for example, a plaintiff could claim that cigarettes, in and of
themselves, are defective because they pose unreasonable health hazards. See, e.g., Kotler v.
American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990); Roysden v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1273 (La. 1991); Hite
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). See generally, Carl T. Bogus,
War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L .REv. 1, 4659 (1995) [hereinafter Bogus, War on the Common Law]; Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical
Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 394-95 (1995). Sometimes this type of liability is called "product category" or "categorical" liability. See Bogus, War
on the Common Law, supra; Grossman, supra; James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:The Rejection of Liability Without Fault, N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1263, 1297 (1991).
The issue of generic liability arises within the law of design defects. It does not arise within
the law of manufacturingdefects (flaws) or marketing defects (failure to warn). A claim of manufacturing defect or marketing defect always involves a claim that the manufacturer should have
produced a safer alternative, that is, a product without the flaw or a product with an adequate
warning.
Nearly all courts use some version of the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility test to
determine whether a product's design is unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective. See,
e.g., Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Mississippi law) (consumer expectation test); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979) (riskutility test); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 (Md. 1976) (risk-utility test);
Brawner v. Liberty Indus., Inc., 573 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (consumer expectation
test); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974) (risk-utility test); Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 585 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979) (risk-utility test); Keller v. Welles
Dep't Store, 276 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (consumer expectation test); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1977) (consumer expectation test). See generally William
Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639,
652-59 [hereinafter Powers, Midwest Proposal]. Claims of generic liability usually arise in the
context of the risk-utility test. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1534
(11th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1272-75 (5th Cir. 1985); Patterson v.
Gisellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660
(Wash. 1986). See generally Grossman, supra, at 393-98. The important feature of generic liability, however, is not the precise test a court uses to evaluate design defects. It is that the plaintiff
can apply the test to the entire product, not just a particular design feature. The important point
is that the plaintiff need not argue that the manufacturer should have used an alternative design.
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about generic liability. We can ask whether it would promote product
safety, a Kantian or Aristotelian conception of justice or consumer
autonomy; whether it would stifle business activity; and so on. I want
to pose a different question, a more mundane and old-fashioned question. In a jurisdiction that has not specifically addressed the issue of
generic liability by statute 2 or caselaw, 3 do traditional doctrinal arguments4 point to a reasonably clear answer to the question of whether a
To put it mildly, generic liability has been controversial. CompareJOHN S. ALLEE, PRODUCT
LIABILITY § 2.05(2)(e), at 2-48 to 2-49 (1986), Grossman, supra; Henderson & Twerski, supra at
1297, Michael Hoenig, Preventing 'Stretched Liability'. The Challenge to Bench and Bar, BNA
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 49, 53-54 (1991); Reporters' Study: Compensations and Liability for
Productand Process Injuries, Proposed Council Draft No. 1, 34-65 (1991) [hereinafter Reporters'
Study]; Donald E. Santarelli & Nicholas E. Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at
Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 507-08 (1983); Victor E.
Schwartz, Liability for 'Defectless' Products, 18 BNA Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. 1104, 1106-07
(1990); Gregory P. Taxin, Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-Related Injuries: "Smokers
Give It Up," 16 J. Prod. & Toxic Liab. 221 (1994); and Note, Handgunsand ProductLiability, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1912 (1984) (all rejecting generic liability) with Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics
and Products Liability, 59 U. CrN. L. REV. 1103, 1148 (1991); Bogus, War on the Common Law,
supra, Marc Z. Edell, Risk Utility Analysis of Unavoidably Unsafe Products, 17 SETON HALL L.
REV. 623, 625-26 (1987), Windle Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 41, 61 (1982), Iveson, Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law Approach, 51 FoiRDHAM L. REV. 771,773 (1983); Andrew 0. Smith,
Comment, The Manufacture and Distributionof Handguns as an Abnormally DangerousActivity, 54 U. Cn. L. REV. 369, 370,379 (1987) (all advocating generic liability). Generic liability has
been one of the most controversial topics for the American Law Institute in drafting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. See RESTATEMENT (Ti-RD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILrrY § 2 & cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). For a more complete account of this
controversy, see Grossman, supra, at 398-99 n.62.
2. All of the statutes addressing generic liability reject it or severely limit its application.
See, e.g., CAL. CrV. CODE § 1714.45 (West Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.51-.59;
MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, § 36-I(h) (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:58C-3 (West 1987); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.005 (Supp. 1996).
3. Most courts that have considered generic liability have rejected it. See, e.g., Kotler, 926
F.2d at 1224-26; Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc. 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); Armijo v. Ex
Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149,
1158 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1214; Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d
236, 240-41 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Baughn, 727 P.2d at 661. A few courts have recognized generic liability. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Kelley v.
R.G. Indus., Inc. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. Ct. App. 1985); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298
(N.J. 1983). Each of these decisions was later overturned or severely limited by statute. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:58C-3; MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, § 36-1(h); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.51-.59.
'Wo other courts have supported generic liability in dictum. See Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 557 F. Supp. 1317, 1320 (E.D. Tex. 1983); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322,
1328 n.5 (Or. 1978). The suggestion in Carteris now precluded by statute. See TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 82.005; see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1995).
4. By "doctrinal argument" I mean an argument by analogy to previous legal decisions
based on the announced or perceived rationales underlying those decisions. Doctrinal argument
relies on policies and purposes, but it purports to take those policies and purposes from existing
precedents. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 145-58 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &

Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994). An interpreter has to make choices about which analogies are apt,
and in doing so may bring his or her own values to the task. Analogy is at least partially in the
eye of the beholder. Nevertheless, doctrinal analysis at least purports to eschew having an inter-
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court should recognize generic liability? Put another way, could a
judge facing the question of generic liability in a case of first impression give reasonably clear doctrinal reasons for deciding one way or
the other? I will suggest that a judge could muster plausible doctrinal
arguments either way and, consequently, could render a legitimate5
6
decision either for or against generic liability.
DIALOGUE

An opponent of generic liability could argue, ex hypothesis, that
no court in the particular jurisdiction has recognized generic liability.
Products liability law has been around for three decades, so if courts
wanted to recognize generic liability, they would already have done
so. It is not the business of courts to create entirely new theories of
liability from whole cloth. 7 That is the role of the legislature. The role
preter simply decide an individual case based on his or her own values. One might ask why we
should be interested in doctrine. One reason is that it is a staple of everyday lawyering. From a
phenomenological perspective, it is difficult to understand the discourses of lawyering without
taking the discourse of doctrine seriously.
5. I borrow the notion of legitimacy from Philip Bobbitt. A legitimate decision is one for
which the reasons of decision can be translated into an accepted mode of analysis in our legal
system, regardless of whether the result is just, according to some external conception of justice.
See PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTrrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
6. Debate about the determinacy of doctrinal debate is, of course, well-known. It is a
standard claim of critical legal theory, and of legal realism before it, that, for every principle we
can construct to explain a line of cases, we can construct a counter-principle that will point the
other way. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOvEMENT 60-75 (1986). In an abstract sense, this claim of indeterminacy is clearly correct. Just as we
can construct an infinite number of mathematical functions to account for any finite number of
points of a graph, we can construct an infinite number of principles to account for a finite
number of precedents. See SAUL A. KiPr E, WITrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 7-9 (1982); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 201 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans. 1953). Put another way, we can always find some basis for distinguishing an
earlier case. From the perspective of everyday interpretation, however, the interesting question
is whether we can construct intuitively plausible counter-principles. Principles that are unduly
convoluted or that do not draw on plausible human goals are unlikely to garner support in an
actual doctrinal debate.
On the other hand, there is a widely-shared urge for uniquely right answers about our legal
rights and obligations. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
Under this view, one account of our legal and social practices puts them in their best light and
therefore provides a principle for ascertaining uniquely right answers in apparently novel cases.
A problem with this view is that, while we might agree on such an account, we also might not.
A problem with both of these views is that their abstractness limits their power to account
for detailed judgments about doctrinal analysis. Each attempts to make global account of doctrinal discourse in its entirety. Thus, neither helps much in accounting for the widely shared experience that some questions of doctrine are fairly well determined, whereas others are not. For
example, courts often contrast issues that have been decided and issues of first impression. My
hope in examining doctrinal debate about generic liability is to shed light on one important
source of indeterminacy in everyday doctrinal debate: sometimes debate about doctrine straddles a fundamental division in the types of doctrinal discourse available to lawyers.
7. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 1, at 405-10.
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of the courts is to apply law as it exists. In any event, if a court does
adopt generic liability, it will have to recognize that it is creating new
law, not applying existing law.
A proponent of generic liability has a convincing doctrinal response. The opponent misstates both the current state of existing law
and the role of courts. While it is true, ex hypothesis, that no court in
the particular jurisdiction has addressed the narrow question of generic liability, courts have decided the broad principles upon which
generic liability is based. Cases applying the risk-utility test to run-ofthe-mill design defect claims provide a good analogy and, therefore, a
good precedent for generic liability.8 Thus, generic liability is not a
novel theory cut from whole cloth. It merely applies ordinary principles of products liability law, already embodied in the risk-utility test,
to a new situation. To be sure, the new situation is the limiting case
for the risk-utility test-because the jury is asked to compare the entire product with no product at all rather than to compare a product's
actual design with a proposed alternative design-but the principles
are not meaningfully different. The jury is still asked, under the riskutility test, whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. Applying
principles embodied in earlier cases to new situations is precisely what
courts are supposed to do.9
The fact that a court has not already recognized generic liability
does not mean that the court has rejected generic liability. It just
means that the court has not been asked to decide one way or the
other. That should not be surprising. The problem of generic liability
understandably comes late in the evolution of products liability law.
From its inception in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.10 and
section 402A, 11 strict products liability has paraded under a false banner. It has never been "true" strict liability in the sense that a plaintiff

8. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or.
1974); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 585 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
9. See, e.g., Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R., 1 Gray 263 (Mass. 1845) (L. Shaw,

C.J.) ("It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law that, instead of a series of
detailed practical rules . . . common law consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles.... [A] consequence of this expansive character of the common law is, that when new

practices spring up, new combinations of facts arise, and cases are presented for which there is
no precedent in judicial decision, they must be governed by the general principle, applicable to

cases most nearly analogous .... "); see HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 372-77.
10. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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need prove only that the defendant's product caused injury. 12 Both
Greenman and section 402A-as well as every case applying strict
products liability-make clear that the plaintiff must prove that the
offending product was defective. In early cases, including Greenman
itself, the question of what constituted a defect was not difficult because the case involved a manufacturing flaw, such as an impurity, a
loose or missing bolt, and so on. When plaintiffs began suing for defectively designed products, however, the question of what constituted
a defect became paramount. Courts grappled with the relative merits
of the consumer expectation test versus the risk-utility test, with most
courts eventually choosing the risk-utility test. 13 Thus, courts asked
jurors to determine whether the risks posed by a particular design feature-such as the absence of a safety guard-outweighed benefits of
the design feature in terms of performance, countervailing safety con4
cerns, and product cost.'
It behooves a plaintiff in a design case to make it as easy as possible for a jury to conclude that the risks of a product feature outweigh
its benefits. Thus, in most cases plaintiffs argue that a minor alteration
in the product's design would have significantly reduced the product's
risks. This strategy makes it more difficult for a defendant to argue
that the product's actual design was sufficiently useful to outweigh any
risks. Although this strategy is constrained by the plaintiff's need to
show that the proposed design alternative would have prevented the
accident, it nevertheless creates a strong incentive for plaintiffs to attack a narrow design feature rather than taking on the additional burden of attacking the entire product. It is not surprising that few courts
have had to confront the issue of generic liability because plaintiffs
generally try to avoid this uphill battle. Consequently, the fact that a
court has not yet confronted a claim of generic liability does not mean
that the court is hostile to such a claim. The fact that plaintiffs rarely
have an interest in attacking an entire product does not mean that the
principles underlying the risk-utility test should be interpreted to preclude a plaintiff from trying.
12. See generally Powers, Modest Proposal,supra note 1, at 652-65; William Powers, Jr., The
Persistenceof Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777,781-97 (1983) [hereinafter Powers,
Persistence].
13. See generally Powers, Modest Proposal,supra note 1, at 654-55.
14. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979); Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033,
1036-38 (Or. 1974); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 585 S.W.2d 844, 857 (Tex. 1979); see also W.
Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability-A Review of Basic Principles, 45
Mo. L. REV. 579 (1980); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the
Requirement of Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855 (1963); Powers, Persistence,supra note 12.
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Put another way, generic liability asks a court to apply the riskutility test to the case in which the best way to improve a product's
safety is not merely to change its design, but instead to forego putting
the product on the market at all. The plaintiff's proposed "alternative
design" in such a case is no product at all. Again, the plaintiff might
have an uphill battle under the risk-utility test to demonstrate that this
alternative is reasonable, but, so the argument goes, there is nothing
in the underlying theory of the risk-utility test that prevents the plaintiff from trying. Only an arbitrary new rule that immunizes this limiting case from scrutiny would prevent a plaintiff from trying, and the
logic of the risk-utility test itself does not contain such an arbitrary
limit.15

This is nothing more than a standard doctrinal argument, an argument by analogy. It claims that any differences between the two sides
of the analogy are superficial. It claims that there is no good reason to
distinguish between applying the risk-utility test to compare an existing product feature with a proposed alternative design and applying
the risk-utility test to compare an existing product feature with the
alternative of no product at all. The argument does not make a direct,
explicit appeal to external claims of justice or efficiency. Rather,
whatever arguments about justice and efficiency that cause courts to
use the risk-utility test for run-of-the-mill cases are just as forceful in
claims of generic liability. That is just what it means to say that the
principles supporting generic liability are already present, albeit inchoately, in existing law.
This leaves an opponent of generic liability with two options for
making a doctrinal attack on this line of argument. First, the opponent can claim that the analogy is inapposite, that is, making a riskutility comparison of an entire product and no product at all is significantly different from making a risk-utility comparison of a product
and a proposed alternative design. 16 Second, the opponent can claim
that another analogy, as good or better than the first, points in the
opposite direction. As it turns out, these two lines of argument are
actually the same.

15. Under this view, a court's decision to recognize generic liability would be a less dramatic "extension" of "existing" law than was the decision to use the risk-utility test rather than
the consumer expectation test in the first place, or the decision to apply strict products liability
law at all to claims of design defect and failure to warn rather than only to claims of manufacturing flaws.
16. See Reporters' Study, supra note 1, at 34-65.
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First consider a search for a competing analogy. Run-of-the-mill
contract cases give the parties autonomy to make their own choices.
As long as a seller does not hide a product's features, the ordinary
principles of contract law give individuals autonomy to choose which
products to buy.17 These principles do not address whether a product's costs and benefits are worthwhile. Whereas the internal logic of
the risk-utility test assigns a jury the power to evaluate a product's risk
and utility, the ordinary principles of contract law forbid jurors to second-guess the parties' judgment about whether, all things considered,
their deal was worthwhile.
A proponent of generic liability might object that run-of-the-mill
contract cases provide a poor analogy because they do not involve a
product that caused personal injury. Run-of-the-mill contract cases
do not even mention products liability law. The problem with this
objection is that we could just as easily say that run-of-the-mill design
defect cases-the cases the proponent relies on-do not involve
claims of generic liability and, in fact, do not even mention generic
liability. Structurally, the two arguments are mirror images.
The cases embodying both analogies can be distinguished from
the case at issue because the whole point of an analogy is to extend
the line of cases to a new factual setting. The question for each proposed analogy is whether to apply the principles embodied in a particular line of cases to the new factual situation. The question is simply:
Which analogy is better? Is a claim of generic liability more like a
claim that a product should have had an alternative design? Or is it
more like a market transaction involving issues other than personal
17. Specific features of contract law sometimes depart from these ordinary principles of

party autonomy, but specific features of law about the risk-utility test also sometimes depart
from the ordinary principles of comparing risk and utility. See, e.g., Verge v. Ford Motor Co.,
851 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978) (multipurpose chassis not subject to ordinary risk-utility analysis);

Caterpillar Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. 1995) (multipurpose machine not subject to
ordinary risk-utility analysis); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (prescription
drugs not subject to ordinary risk-utility analysis); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
cmt. k (1965) (unavoidably unsafe products not subject to ordinary risk-utility analysis). It is still
the case that run-of-the-mill contracts cases do not evaluate the "reasonableness" of the parties'
deal. Thus, the ordinary principles of contract law run counter to the ordinary principles of the
risk-utility test. See generally William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209 (1994)
[hereinafter Powers, Border Wars]. It is the ordinaryprinciples of each line of cases that support
the competing doctrinal analogies.
Professor Bogus has recognized these competing principles as a tension between what he
calls Abinger's Paradigm-taken from Lord Abinger's opinion in Winterbottem v. Wright, 10 M
& W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), and representing a claim that market solutions should
control product liability cases-and what he calls Cardozo's Paradigm-taken from Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buck Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), and representing
an appeal to tort principles to give manufacturers incentives to make safer products. See Bogus,
War on the Common Law, supra note 1, at 9-30.
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injury? Translated into the rubric of distinguishing cases, the question
is which distinction is more significant: the distinction between product liability cases involving personal injury and run-of-the-mill contract cases, or the distinction between applying the risk-utility test to
compare a narrow product feature with an alternative design and applying the risk-utility test to compare an entire product with no product at all. 18 We have just come full circle. The search for a competing
analogy just turns out to be the same question as whether the original
analogy is a good one after all.
Recognizing that conflicting lines of cases are a major source of
ambiguity in doctrinal analysis is hardly new. 19 The standard doctrinal
response is to try to resolve the conflict by referring to purposes and
policies that are drawn from a broader legal context and that transcend the conflicting lines of cases. 20 But a problem arises with these
particular competing lines of cases-products liability and contract autonomy-because the conflict occurs so deep in the structure of legal
doctrine. 21 If two lines of conflicting cases occur within a single body
of law-for example, tort law or contract law-a judge can at least try
to find overarching purposes and policies in that body of law. The
judge might or might not succeed. It might turn out that the particular
body of law is already too broad to reveal unifying purposes and policies, or that it is too riddled with arbitrary compromises to reveal unifying purposes and policies. Even if a judge could succeed in this task
18. A proponent of generic liability might respond that courts have already decided this
issue by routinely applying the risk-utility test rather than ordinary principles of contract law to
products liability cases. This response begs the question, however. Courts routinely apply the
risk-utility test to products liability cases involving claims of alternative design, not to products
liability cases involving claims of generic liability. Again, the question remains whether cases
involving claims of generic liability are better analogized to products liability cases involving
claims of alternative design or to run-of-the-mill contract cases.

19. See, e.g., The Case of the Faithless Fiduciary,in HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 383-97.
The actual case is Berenson v. Nirenstein,93 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1950). It involved the question

whether the defendant's oral promise to buy stock for the plaintiff as the plaintiffs agent was
governed by a line of cases applying the statute of frauds or by a line of cases creating construc-

tive trusts, notwithstanding the statute of frauds. See id.
20. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 396; see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
21. The theoretical problems with the approach are well known, and are real. Nevertheless,
judges and lawyers routinely engage in the analogical reasoning of doctrinal analysis. It constitutes an established rhetoric of our legal system, whatever its logical status. It is important to a
phenomenological understanding of law to try to understand this mode of discourse on its own
terms. The important point here is that the doctrinal conflict presented by the problem of ge-

neric liability poses special problems for doctrinal analysis, even on its own terms. See supra
note 6. See generally UNGER, supra note 6, at 43-90. In the context of a general critique, Unger
addresses the specific conflict between the ordinary principles of fairness and the ordinary principles of contract. See id. at 66-75. That is structurally similar to the conflict here between the
ordinary principles of the risk-utility test and the ordinary principles of contract law.
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within a discrete body of law, however, resolving the conflict between
the ordinary principles of risk-utility and the ordinary principles of
contract autonomy is more difficult because the conflict occurs across
the very doctrinal boundaries that define the most basic legal rhetorics
we use.

The risk-utility test and the principle of contract autonomy represent fundamentally different ways of talking about social and legal arrangements. 22 The risk-utility test employs the rhetoric that products
should be reasonable under the circumstances, defined primarily by a
cost-benefit conception of reasonableness. 23 It assigns power to juries.
It reflects the ideology of utilitarianism. The principle of contract autonomy, on the other hand, employs the rhetoric that individuals
should be able to decide for themselves how to balance the costs and
benefits of their own decisions. 24 It assigns power to private markets.
It reflects the ideology of freedom and consent.25 Since these two distinct rhetorics fracture legal discourse at its very foundation, it is difficult to construct doctrinal arguments that transcend them. Doctrinal
argument, after all, requires an appeal to purposes that are deeper
than, and therefore transcend, competing lines of cases. 26 If the conflict straddles fault lines at doctrine's most fundamental level, we have
22. See Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17.
23. The risk-utility test is similar in this respect to the basic rhetoric of negligence.
Although the risk-utility test supposedly differs from negligence because it purports to evaluate
the defendant's product, not the defendant's conduct, but see Powers, Modest Proposal, supra
note 1, at 652-59, it is similar to negligence in that it assigns to a jury the task of determining,
after the fact and under roughly a cost-benefit test, whether a risk was reasonable.
24. Sometimes contract law departs from this basic rhetoric, such as when it holds that a
contract is unconscionable. See, e.g., Hennigsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960); U.C.C. § 2.302 (1970). This is a departure from ordinary principles of contract law, however. Party autonomy remains the core of contract rhetoric. See supra note 23. I do not claim
that the "core" of contract rhetoric and the "periphery" (or the "rule" and the "exception")
occur naturally. They are products of the way lawyers talk about law. We can deconstruct them
when we want to, but we can also recognize them when we want to do that. See Powers, Border
Wars, supra note 17, at 1211-12 n.14.
25. Contract autonomy and the cost-benefit conception of reasonableness are not the only
basic rhetorics of law. Property law's basic rhetoric gives people entitlements to property and
then lets them decide how to use the property. It assigns power to property owners and reflects
the ideology of property rights. Furthermore, legislative regulation, of which criminal law is an
example, assigns power to the legislature and is supported by the ideology of democracy. These
basic rhetorics are not totally independent. For example, property rights are more valuable if
they can be traded. But the rhetorics themselves are fundamentally different. The fact that
these fundamental, yet competing, rhetorics define basic divisions in the first-year law school
curriculum is no accident. See generally Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17.
26. It is interesting to note the metaphors employed to represent doctrinal analysis. Hart
and Sacks employ the "Great Pyramid of the Legal Order." See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at
286-87. Dworkin employs the idea of "gravitational force." See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 81130. Both metaphors suggest convergence. My suggestion here is that, while transcending policies and purposes might lead to convergence on "local" doctrinal issues, we do not necessarily
continue to converge as we delve deeper into legal discourse. At some point we might discover
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nothing left other than to choose the "logic" of one of the competing
rhetorics.
But maybe it is too early to give up. Maybe the existing structure
of these two competing rhetorics reveals a hierarchy that we can employ to select a method of choosing one over the other. In fact, I have
suggested elsewhere that there is such a hierarchy. 27 In hard cases,
such as cases involving generic liability, contract principles and riskutility principles seem to conflict. In easy cases,2s however, courts regularly use the rhetoric of contract autonomy to trump jury determinations of reasonableness. These cases are so easy that we do not even
see them as presenting a conflict of fundamental principles.
Consider an ordinary contract to sell wheat, with a contract price
of one dollar per bushel. If the seller does not deliver, the buyer's
remedy is measured (roughly) by comparing the contract price with
the buyer's cover price.29 We take the contract price as a benchmark.
We do not let the jury determine, in cost-benefit terms, whether the
buyer (or seller) acted reasonably in setting the contract price at one
dollar per bushel. That is just what a real commitment to the costbenefit rhetoric of reasonableness would demand. We might have to
suspend disbelief to apply the rhetoric of reasonableness to a problem
that should obviously be governed by contract principles, but this
merely shows how easily we have come to accept the notion of contract autonomy trumping reasonableness. Nothing in the internal
logic of the rhetoric of reasonableness eschews reference to a costbenefit analysis to set a reasonable "contract price" and therefore to
calculate the buyer's remedy. A decision to apply contract principles
to this case is a decision-albeit an implicit one-to privilege contract
autonomy over reasonableness. We can find hundreds of run-of-themill contract cases that do the same thing.
The converse, however, is not true. Although courts sometimes
privilege reasonableness over contract autonomy, they do not do so
routinely. Every contracts case privileges contract law over tort law,
because nothing else can explain the outcome. Nothing internal to the
rhetoric of reasonableness precludes it from governing a case. Put anirreconcilable discontinuities, which create problems for doctrinal analysis, even on its own
terms.
27. See Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17, at 1223-29.

28. We often can learn more about the legal system from easy cases than from hard cases.
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. RaV. 399, 407-10 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Johnson, 133 S.W. 784 (Ky. 1911); U.C.C. §§ 2711, 2-712 & 2-713 (1970).
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other way, the rhetoric of reasonableness never turns itself off.30 Only

a decision from the outside to privilege another rhetoric turns off the
rhetoric of reasonableness. On the other hand, most tort cases do not
even present a conflict between the rhetoric of reasonableness and the
rhetoric of contract autonomy because most tort cases involve strangers. In cases involving strangers, the internal logic of the contract
rhetoric turns itself off without any help from the outside. Since most
tort cases do not involve a "real" conflict between the rhetoric of reasonableness and the rhetoric of contract autonomy, a decision to use
reasonableness does not tell us anything about the hierarchy of the
two principles. Thus, it seems that the principles of contract autonomy and reasonableness are not on equal footing. The principle of
reasonableness takes a back seat to contract autonomy, waiting to fill
in when contract autonomy gives up of its own accord, that is, when
the parties do not have a contract or when there has been some other
form of perceived market failure. 31
A proponent of generic liability has an easy doctrinal answer to
this argument. Even if the deep structure of contract and tort law
suggests, as a general matter, that the rhetoric of reasonableness takes
a back seat to the rhetoric of contract autonomy, this is not true in
products liability cases. Routine products liability cases are precisely
where courts apply the principles of reasonableness to a market transaction. Routine products liability cases are precisely the cases in
which the rhetoric of reasonableness trumps the rhetoric of contract
autonomy. Conversely, an opponent of generic liability can then respond that this is true only in routine product liability cases-that is,
in cases involving claims that the manufacturer should have used an
alternative design.
So we are right back where we started. We still do not know
which line of authority is the exception and which is the rule. We still
do not know whether to privilege the rhetoric of contract autonomy or
the rhetoric of reasonableness. 32 Not only have we not resolved the
30. The rhetoric of reasonableness never fails by its own terms. Left to its own devices, it
would swallow up the entire world of legal discourse. Whatever boundaries it has are imposed
from outside its own internal logic. That is not true of law's other basic organizing rhetorics. By
their own terms, contract, legislative, and property rhetorics give up of their own accord when
there is no agreement, statute, or property owner, respectively. See Powers, Border Wars, supra
note 17, at 1225-26 n.54.
31. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 209-32; Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17, at
1226-29.
32. We might resort here to the perceived purposes that lie behind this structure. For example, we might privilege contract autonomy generally on the ground that it better allows parties to
plan their affairs than does an after-the-fact, ad hoc jury determination of reasonableness. Con-
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issue, we have not made any progress at all. We are still faced with
the same question that began our inquiry: Should the market or juries
resolve the relative costs and benefits of a product's overall design?
Maybe a proponent of generic liability can return to more local
terrain surrounding cases involving generic liability. We know that
run-of-the-mill product liability cases, that is, cases involving claims of
alternative design, refuse to privilege contract autonomy over reasonableness. According to the previous argument, law generally privileges contract autonomy over reasonableness and applies
reasonableness only when the rhetoric of contract autonomy has given
up on its own accord. This must mean that, in run-of-the-mill design
defect cases, contract autonomy has given up on its own accord. This
is just a recognition that we cannot trust the market to provide solutions in these cases. The only feature that can possibly distinguish
run-of-the-mill design defect cases from run-of-the-mill contract cases
is the nature of the plaintiff's injury. Thus, run-of-the-mill design defect cases must reflect a recognition that the predicate conditions for
consumer autonomy are missing when the issue is evaluating a risk of
personal injury. Since this feature is also present in cases involving
generic liability, the analogy to run-of-the-mill design defect cases, not
run-of-the-mill contract cases, is the appropriate one.
But, alas, an opponent of generic liability can still offer a plausible counter-principle. True, run-of-the-mill design defect cases involving a claim of alternative design reflect a preference against a market
solution. If the only salient feature of those cases is that they involve
personal injury, courts should also eschew a market solution in cases
involving claims of generic liability. But personal injury is not the
versely, we might just intrinsically value autonomy. See supra note 24. Whatever specific purposes we attribute to privileging contract autonomy over reasonableness, the deep structure of
legal doctrine suggests that we "really" prefer contract solution over jury determinations of rea-

sonableness. We resort to jury determinations of reasonableness only when contact principles
give up on their own accord and on their own terms. Similar purposes could be ascribed to the
priority of property principles and the legislative solutions over the tort solutions. Legislatures

sometimes do not act. Property entitlements sometimes do not work (for example, it is difficult
in advance to assign property entitlements to be free from risk, pollution, and emotional harm).
When these paradigms fail on their own accord, we resort to the less preferable approach of
evaluating conduct after the fact by way of the vague standard of reasonableness. However, it is
only when these other paradigms fail that we do this. See Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17, at
1224-25. But, alas, this doctrinal move also fails to resolve the issue. A proponent of generic

liability again will argue that it is just a rejection of market solutions that explains why we rely on
the risk-utility test in run-of-the-mill design defect cases. The reason we do not trust a market
solution is that courts, for whatever reason, do not trust the market when it comes to personal
injury. This explanation is just as applicable to claims of generic liability. Thus, we are right
back where we started.
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only salient feature of run-of-the-mill design defect cases. It is not the
only plausible source of a preference against a market solution.
.The problem with relying on a market solution in run-of-the-mill
design defect cases is not that consumers cannot evaluate risks of personal injury. Consumers do that when they make choices about nondefective products that nevertheless pose risks of personal injury. 33
The real problem is that consumers have a hard time making market
choices when one of the choices is unknown to them. How can they
compare the relative costs and benefits of a product as it is actually
designed with the costs and benefits of the same product with an alternative design if they do not have any idea what the alternative would
be? The problem for a market solution is that one side of the consumers' "choice" is unknown to the consumer. This problem is not present in a case involving generic liability. When the "alternative design"
is no product at all-or substituting a second product for the first 34 the consumer knows about the alternative. Thus, so the argument
goes, the source of market failure in run-of-the-mill design defect
cases is not present in cases involving claims of generic liability.35
A proponent of generic liability can still find doctrinal support in
an unlikely place. Some courts have held that the mere fact that a
manufacturer offers a nondefective version of a product does not insulate from scrutiny of the risk-utility test the version of the product
33. A real distrust of the market to evaluate information about personal injury risks would
internalize all personal injury costs into the price of the product. See Powers, Modest Proposal,
supra note 1, at 648 n.38. However, that would be true strict liability, not liability based on

defect. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. Because courts have rejected true strict
liability, this rationale has a difficult time explaining the cases.
34. Rejecting generic liability would raise the problem of determining what constitutes an
alternative design of the same product and what constitutes a different product altogether. Are
four-wheel all terrain vehicles an alternative design of three-wheel all terrain vehicles, or are
they a different product altogether? Are sedans an alternative design of convertibles or a different product altogether? The rationale discussed in text could be used to help answer these questions. To the extent that a plaintiff's proposed alternative design is already on the market (as in
the case of sedans and convertibles), the plaintiff's claim would constitute a claim of generic

liability.
A proponent of generic liability could argue that these problems of line drawing give us an
independent pragmatic reason to reject a rejection of generic liability.
35. The question here is not whether consumers are "really" able to evaluate these issues.
It is whether one rationale or the other constitutes a plausible account for previous decisions.
The task here is one of hermeneutics, not one of social science.
A proponent of generic liability might find support in language that refers to the special
nature of personal injuries as explaining run-of-the-mill design defect cases. An opponent could

respond, however, that these statements were in the context of cases involving claims of alternative design and that the courts never addressed or mentioned whether the situation would be
different in a claim of generic defect. So the problem remains. The opponent of generic liability
can still distinguish run-of-the-mill design defect cases, including the language contained in them,

based on a plausible rationale.
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actually sold. 36 Such a holding seems to be incompatible with a claim
that lack of information about alternative designs is what explains a
decision to eschew market solutions in run-of-the-mill design defect
cases. The consumer does know about the alternative design when
the seller actually offers it to the consumer, but these courts still reject
a market solution.
An opponent of generic liability seems to be in a doctrinal corner
here, but he is not without weapons. Most jurisdictions have not specifically addressed the issue, so the opponent's proposed explanation
of run-of-the-mill design defect cases is still available. Even in a jurisdiction that has decided such a case, the case simply might be wrong,
that is, wrong for the very reason that it misreads the proper rationale,
37
discussed above, underlying run-of-the-mill design defect cases.
Nevertheless, a case applying the risk-utility test when the consumer
was offered an option provides a doctrinal embarrassment to an opponent of generic liability. In a jurisdiction that has decided such a case,
the proponent of generic liability seems to have the better doctrinal
argument. 38 In a jurisdiction that has not decided such a case, both
sides have plausible doctrinal arguments because both sides can construct plausible principles to explain existing cases. One reason for
this is that the competing principles-risk-utility and contract autonomy-occur at the very foundation of legal discourse. 39
36. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). Bilotta involved a
dockboard, which is a device used to bridge the gap between a warehouse loading dock and the
bed of a truck being loaded. See id. at 619. The defendant sold a version with a safety device to
prevent the dockboard from falling if the truck pulled away from the dock. See id. The plaintiff's employer chose to buy a less expensive dockboard without the safety device. See id. at 620.
The court held that offering the option did not insulate the dockboard without the safety device

from scrutiny under the risk-utility test. See id. at 624. This does not necessarily mean that a
dockboard with the safety device was compelled by the risk-utility test. It just means that offering the option did not insulate the dockboard without the option under the risk-utility test.
37. An opponent of generic liability could also argue that Bilotta can be explained on the
ground that the employer, not the plaintiff, bought the dockboard. Thus, the plaintiff's interests,

by definition, were not represented in the market transaction. This argument raises the general
issue of recovery by bystanders in products liability cases. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969). Bystanders are never represented in a market transaction, so the

rhetoric of contract autonomy, by its own terms, does not apply. This suggests that, whatever
rules apply to consumers, bystanders should be able to rely on claims of generic liability.

38. Maybe an opponent can come forward with different principles to explain the cases. He
can certainly do so in theory. See supra note 6. Whether he can construct intuitively attractive
principles is another matter, however.
39. While it is true that, in theory, we can always construct competing principles to explain
existing cases-and therefore doctrinal debate is always inconclusive-in practice, doctrinal de-

bate sometimes reaches closure because we reject some of the proposed principles as being intuitively implausible. But sometimes it does not. This depends on the nature of the doctrinal
debate, including how deep in the structure of legal discourse the debate takes place. As it turns

out, the Balkanized structure of legal discourse at its foundation renders doctrinal discourse
more difficult, not less difficult, the deeper it occurs. Thus, the metaphors of convergence used
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Some people may be impatient at this point. All of this just
shows, they would claim, that doctrinal analysis is impoverished. Conflicts between basic legal rhetorics, such as contract autonomy and
risk-utility, show the arbitrary nature of our legal rhetorics. The way
out of this mess is to turn to a more sophisticated, more powerful, and
deeper normative discourse, such as a theory of justice 40 or, more
41
likely, economic theory.
A turn to "deeper" normative theories to resolve doctrinal disputes, or to account for an area of law generally, is a natural outgrowth of the legal process school. 42 An important tenant of the legal
process school is that, although law has ambiguities on the surface,
43
courts can and should resolve them with reference to law's purposes.
If this method can resolve local ambiguities by referring to local purposes, why should it not also be able to resolve global ambiguities by
referring to global purposes? The only task is to ascertain law's global
purposes. Prime candidates, of course, are economic efficiency and
various conceptions of justice. Not only can we use these normative
theories to critique legal decisions, we can use them to account for
existing legal decisions, thus resolving seemingly ambiguous doctrinal
results. Under this view, these normative theories are not just external to law, they are part of law. They are part of the very method of
doctrinal analysis.
My purpose here is not to evaluate which of these normative theories provides the best account of our legal practices. In fact, I do not
think our legal practices are in need of any foundational account of
the type these theories purport to provide. 44 Even on their own
terms, however, these normative theories are highly overrated in their
ability to perform the function of bringing closure to an otherwise indeterminate doctrinal analysis. 45 Consider economics. Can it provide
by Hart and Sacks and by Dworkin are misleading. See supra note 26. Doctrinal analysis is a
technique of legal analysis that is better-suited to local issues, not global issues.
40. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-Relational Relationships: A Note on Coleman's New
Theory, 77 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1992).
41. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRuc'URE OF TORT
LAW (1987).

42. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
43. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 150-52; Fuller, supra note 42, at 661-66.
44. See, e.g., BoBBrI-r, supra note 5; William Powers, Jr., On Positive Theories of Tort Law,
66 TEx. L. REV. 191 (1987) (reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 41).

45. This does not mean that these theories are not useful in providing critiques of specific
legal doctrines or in providing information that is useful to lawyers. It just means that these
theories cannot perform the role of resolving doctrinal disputes of the sort presented by the
question of generic liability.
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an overarching account of our legal practice that resolves conflicts between Balkanized doctrinal rhetorics of more traditional doctrinal
analyses such as reasonableness and contract autonomy? I think not.
Economic theory is just as indeterminate as doctrinal analysis, not just
because it is itself ambiguous, but because it too is Balkanized along
46
precisely the same lines as the doctrinal rhetorics.
Economists can construct a well-recognized argument that a caseby-case jury determination of reasonableness (in cost-benefit terms)
promotes efficiency. 47 This argument, however, depends on an implicit claim that juries are well-equipped to evaluate conduct under a
cost-benefit test and that private actors can predict, with reasonable
accuracy, what juries will do.4 On the other hand, economists can
49
also construct competing arguments to support freedom of contract.
These arguments depend on an implicit claim that private market
transactions reflect true social costs and benefits reasonably well, that
is, that externalities are low. 50 In terms of predictability and costs of
adjudication, each competing model also makes different implicit assumptions about the tension between short-term gains from having
juries adjudicate individual cases correctly and long-term gains from
allowing parties to fix their obligations by contract. 51 An economic
analysis of a doctrinal problem provides closure only if these competing assumptions about juries and markets can be resolved.
The problem is not just that economic analysis does or does not
provide closure; it is that economic analysis does or does not provide
closure for exactly the same reasons doctrinal analysis does or does
not provide closure. Each system depends on exactly the same question: which better reflects true social costs and benefits, jury decisions
46. See Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17, at 1220-23.
47. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The
Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 44-45 (1990); John P. Brown,
Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 338-43 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Gathering Storm, REG. 15, 19-20 (Sept. - Oct. 1977); Richard A.
Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206-07 (1973).
48. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353, 409-10 (1988).
49. See id.; Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
78 VA. L. REv. 821, 841-49 (1992).
50. See, e.g., John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1139, 1198 (1990);
Daniel R. Mandeker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in LandUse Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 4 (1993).
51. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 41, at 143-46; RICHa A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw § 3.1, at 32 (4th ed. 1993); Mark S. Broden, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CN. L. REV. 15, 36
(1990); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient? 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711, 759 (1980).
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about reasonableness in individual cases or market transactions? Just
as our legal rhetorics and ideologies organize themselves around markets and juries, so too do competing economic rhetorics and ideologies. So we are right back where we started. Our normative world,
legal or otherwise, is just fractured in ways that are difficult to transcend. We recognize this feature of legal discourse because legal
scholars have spent much time and energy studying the nature of legal
rhetoric. If as much time and energy were spent deconstructing economic rhetorics, we would52be more familiar with the fractured nature
of those rhetorics as well.
Thus, there may be no uniquely convincing doctrinal answer to
the question of generic liability. Or, more accurately, there may be
two convincing doctrinal answers, each pointing in the opposite direction. A court could write a legitimate doctrinal opinion to support
either result. 53 This is true, not because of any theoretical claim about
law's indeterminacy (though that may be true too), but because of the
particular Balkanized nature of legal discourse in our system of legal
54
practice.
EPILOGUE

Should we recoil from this situation or embrace it? In one sense,
we have no choice but to embrace it, at least if we want to avoid paralysis. In Lon Fuller's rightly famous Case of the Speluncean Explorers,
five judges confronted a problem involving explorers who were
trapped in a cave and who killed a colleague to eat and thereby save
their own lives. 55 The question was whether they should be convicted
of murder. Three of the judges-Keen, Foster, and Handy-wrote ex52. Economists might be able to provide an algorithm to resolve its own Balkanized structure by providing a general theory to determine when juries and when markets contribute more
to overall efficiency. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNR, supra note 51, at 143-46. In theory, an economic analogue to Dworkin's Hercules could make all the calculations necessary to give a
"right" answer. But this new Hercules would be subject to all the problems of Dworkin's Hercules. In hard cases, it would be only Hercules, and not we, who would know the answer.

We might bow to other normative systems, such as various conceptions of justice, but they
too are likely to be just as fractured as legal rhetoric. See Powers, Border Wars, supra note 17, at
1222-23; William Powers Jr., ConstructingLiberal Political Theory, 72 TEx. L. REv. 443, 448-49,
457-59 (1993) (reviewing JoHN RAWLS, PoLrriCAL LIBERALSM (1993)), and T.K. Seung, IruiTION AND CONsTRUCrION (1993)).
53. See BoBBrrr, supra note 5.
54. See id. Bobbitt claims that our legal practice is fractured along methodological lines.
Judges have at their disposal six legitimate modes of legal rhetoric: doctrinal, ethical, prudential,

historical, structural, and textual. See id. Sometimes these modes reach conflicting results.
Thus, judges have choices in which they rely on conscience and faith. See id. My claim is that
law's rhetorics are also fractured along substantive lines, to the same effect.
55. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:169

tremely sophisticated and convincing opinions. A reader might nod
approvingly reading each one. Yet because each judge employed a
different legal rhetoric, they reached different conclusions. A fourth
judge-Judge Tatting-then recused himself.56 He could not decide
which rhetoric was correct, so he could not responsibly decide the case
without just making a choice. Paralysis in the face of choice is not any
answer. When we reach a fork in the road, we should take it!
We should do more than take forks in the legal road, we should
relish them. The fractured structure of our legal and social rhetorics is
just what provides room for choice. It is one of the things that gives
each generation the ability to create its own legal regime. 57 Why we
would want it otherwise is a mystery. In the end, however, it is beyond my power or purpose here to argue that we are better off with a
vision of doctrinal analysis that sometimes forces choices. I can only
offer a few comments on these choices.
First, it is worth repeating that the source of choice here is not a
theoretical claim that all normative systems are indeterminate. That
claim has a certain truth as well, but we at least experience many normative arguments as being determinative on their own terms, notwithstanding any theoretical understanding to the contrary. Put another
way, language usually seems to work. The source of choice here is an
additional one. It is that our doctrinal rhetorics just happen to be Balkanized in the ways I have described.
A hallmark of post-modern thought is that there is no single,
meta-narrative that makes all of our beliefs hang together in a coherent way. Instead, we understand the world through competing, local
narratives.58 Theoretically, there could be an infinite number of competing narratives. In practice, however, we experience life through a
few such narratives, such as physics, law, economics, religion, and so
on. Thus, it is useful to study how the narratives that actually dominate discourse operate. My claim is that, in doctrinal analysis at least,
the competing rhetorics of contract autonomy, reasonableness, and so
on (along with their associated social institutions and ideologies) are
56. The fifth judge-Judge Truepenny-had little interesting to say other than to set the
stage.
57. As a practical matter, judges routinely disagree about the meaning of cases. Sometimes
they are even willing to overrule specific precedents. Each of these provides for play in the
joints. Play in the joints, however, is not just the result of disagreement among individual,

human judges. It is built into the very structure-the fractured structure-of legal rhetoric. See
BOBBrrr, supra note 5.
58. See JEAN FRANcoIs LYOTARD, TIE POST MODERN CONDMON: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
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bedrock narratives of doctrinal discourse, and that there is no overarching meta-narrative to adjudicate among them.
Second, the mere fact that doctrinal arguments do not always give
definitive answers to conflicts between law's basic rhetorics-for the
very reason that doctrinal arguments are themselves the products of
these rhetorics-does not mean that other forms of argument cannot
give interesting accounts of these choices. For example, the sociologist Alvin Gouldner-who spent much of his scholarly effort giving a
Marxist account of Marxism 59-might have had interesting things to
say about these competing rhetorics. Turning the tools of Marx's analysis 60 on Marxism itself, Gouldner concluded that intellectuals are
drawn to Marxism not because it empowers the working class but because it empowers intellectuals and technocrats. 61 By taking questions of social organization out of the hands of the bourgeoisie and the
aristocracy and putting them in the hands of the intellegenia, socialism
is the West's version of Mandarin organization.
Similar consequences are at stake, to a more limited degree, in
choices among law's basic rhetorics. As we have seen, the rhetorics of
property rights and contract autonomy empower property holders and
individuals who succeed in the market. Not only do they disempower
the poor, they disempower the Mandarins. It is not surprising that, at
least in my experience, teachers of Contracts law and Property law are
far more likely to teach "against" the topic-by showing how contract
rights and property rights are part of a complex web of social interaction 62-than are teachers of Torts. Entrepreneurs would be more
likely to have it just the other way around. It is easier for intellectuals
to recognize the class biases of entrepreneurs than to recognize the
class biases of intellectuals. 63
59. See ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE
NEW CLASS (1979) [hereinafter GOULDNER, THE FUTURE]; ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE Two
MARXISMS: CONTRADICTIONS AND ANOMALIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY (1980) [hereinafter GOULDNER, Two MARXISMS].
60. See, e.g., KARL MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (C. Arthur ed., 1979).

61. See GOULDNER, THE FUTURE, supra note 59; GOULDNER, Two MARXISMS supra note
59.
62. See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 231.
63. Of course, there are exceptions to this general observation. Law and economics scholars who valorize the market are obvious exceptions. Moreover, the class interests of the intelligensia are changing rapidly. Information and analysis themselves are increasingly important
forms of property and market power. Thus, pervayors of information-such as lawyers, accountants, bankers, and consultants-are becoming increasingly important market players. It is also
interesting to note that intellectuals have a special rhetoric-academic freedom and freedom of
speech-for insulating themselves from scrutiny under a standard of reasonableness.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:169

Finally, the availability of competing rhetorics has an interesting
effect on law's relationship to religious faith. Very few legal theorists
today espouse a strong view of natural law, that is, a view that law is a
product of the moral and spiritual order God imprinted on the structure of the world. What then is the role of religious faith in the secular
legal world of positivism. If secular normative theories, such as economic efficiency, resolve all of the ambiguities and gaps left by positive law, there is no room in our normative discourse for faith. Some
people prefer it that way. But if the borders of the fractured legal
rhetorics provide opportunities of real choice, there is room for faith
after all.64 Even from a secular perspective, conflicts among the basic
conflicting rhetorics of doctrinal analysis provide options from choice.
They are part of what gives us, not our theories, control over our normative future.
Sometimes we just have to choose. 65

64. See BOBBrr-r, supra note 5.
65. See FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, NoTEs FROM UNDERGROUND (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhonsky trans., 1994).

